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We develop a simple model to study how globalization affects wage inequalities. The 
model features three goods, one is an “international” good, and two are local non-trad-
able goods. The non-tradable goods are produced by local labor, either skilled or 
unskilled, while labor of all types and all origins contribute to the production of the 
international good. We find that increasing participation of the South in global produc-
tion and consumption lead to an increase in wage inequalities in the North. Higher 
South integration into global value chains reduces North-South wage inequalities.*
I. Introduction
One of the hottest debates on the effects of the present so-called globalization concerns 
its consequences for income inequality, both between nations and within nations. 
 BourGuiGnon,  F., and r.  GuEsnEriE [1996] asked whether globalization decreases 
inequalities between nations while increasing inequalities within nations, in line with 
the questions feeding the titles of the articles of FrEEman, r. [1995], rodrik, d. [1997] 
or more recently EBEnstEin, a., a. Harrison, and m. mC millan [2014]. The present 
paper attempts to shed light on the issue from a partial and in a sense naive view-
point. The viewpoint is partial since the paper voluntarily leaves aside the questions 
associated either with capital accumulation or technical progress, whose distributional 
dimension has raised a lot of recent debates and controversies. It is also naive, in the 
sense that it provides a simplistic image of international trade which, although refer-
ring to the simplest version of the Heckscher-Ohlin model which has come to dominate 
trade modelling after the 19th century episode of globalization, attempts to depart as 
much as possible from its defining features. In the Heckscher-Ohlin story, international 
trade concerns goods produced from immobile local factors. In our model, besides local 
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non-traded goods, there is a single international good which is internationally produced 
from all local factors and consumed in everywhere. Naturally, this model captures an 
extreme form of trade which extrapolates from the present trend associated with the 
continuous increasing role of multinational firms. It echoes the idea that the produc-
tion of manufactures is associated with a “global value chain”, which in this model 
is an aggregate of the global value chains of many specific manufactured goods (see 
timmEr, m., et al. [2014]). Finally, for the sake of simplicity, our world has two blocks, 
or regions, metaphorically the North and the South, echoing again the prospects of 
timmEr, m., et al.
Let us sum up. Our world has three goods: the international good produced 
“nowhere”, and the two local non-traded goods. The non-traded goods are produced from 
local labor, either skilled or unskilled, while labor of all types and all origins contribute 
to the production of the international good. The paper aims at providing a clear under-
standing of the forces shaping inequalities between the North and the South, as well as 
between workers of different skills in the North, in the admittedly simplistic world under 
consideration. Most forms of globalization that we consider lead to an increase in wage 
inequalities in the North, while improving the wage of South’s unskilled workers. We 
complement the theoretical analysis with a simple numerical simulation of our model. 
It aims at capturing an operationally more plausible image of the world under scru-
tiny, while stressing what we believe to be reasonable interpretations of the theoretical 
insights.
Our paper contributes to a burgeoning literature analysing global values chains and 
offshoring, of which closer to our work is aCEmoGlu, d., et al. [2015]. Our approach is not 
in opposition, but rather attempts to provide a complementary view, to papers modelling 
offshoring and international production in Heckscher-Ohlin frameworks, where visible 
contributions include HElpman, E. [1984] and Grossman, G., and E. rossi-HansBErG 
[2008].1
How does this paper relate to Malinvaud’s scientific work? Let us remind the division 
of labor promoted by the Econometric Society: theory leaning on appropriate modelling 
on the one hand, empirical analysis relying on statistical examination of existing data 
on the other hand. Clearly, Malinvaud was one of the few people of his generation able 
to undertake frontier research on each side of the line. Our paper, even if we sketch at 
the end a quantitative illustration of the model under scrutiny, is clearly on one side of 
the dividing line. It goes without saying that our subject has no close connections with 
a number of subjects which were behind E.  Malinvaud’s theoretical work, and does 
not concern, to take some examples, either intertemporal equilibrium, (malinvaud, E. 
[1953]) or planning. Our preocupations however echo a constant interest of Malinvaud, 
as a professional economist as well as a policy adviser, for wages and income distribu-
tion problems.
1. In recent work, CarluCCio, J., et al. [2016] modify the factor-proportions model to include trade in inputs 
and heterogeneous firms. For a variety of views of globalization, see e.g. Broda, C., J. GrEEnFiEld, and 
d. WEinstEin [2006], Costinot, a., and J. voGEl [2010], tHoEniG, m., and t. vErdiEr [2003].
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Indeed, the labor market is the explicit subject of a number of his contributions 
(malinvaud, E. [1980], [1983], [1984], [1994]) and a key implicit question behind his 
investigations in the economics of fixed prices and macroeconomics (malinvaud,  E. 
[1981 et 1982], [1991]), or even growth (malinvaud, E. [1986], [1987]). And in a sense 
our text attempts to shed some different light on the functioning of labor markets in the 
new context of globalization.
We proceed in a standard way: we present the model in sECtion II, provide the equi-
librium analysis in sECtion III, discuss the comparative statics analysis in sECtion IV 
and provide a simple numerical simulation in sECtion V. sECtion VI concludes.
II. Model Setup
The world is divided in two countries, the richer one, called North, and the poorer 
one, called South, with different types of labor as factors of production. All variables 
pertaining to North are denoted in capitals, and all variables pertaining to South in 
lower-case.
In North, there are H  skilled workers and L  unskilled workers. In South, there are 
no skilled workers and   unskilled workers. Labor is perfectly mobile across sectors 
within countries, but immobile across borders. Labor markets are perfectly competitive. 
Wages ( , , )W W wH L  will be determined in equilibrium.
There are three goods. Two of them are local (non-tradable) goods: one is produced 
and consumed in the North and the other is produced and consumed in the South. 
The third one is an industrial good I , consumed in both countries and produced by 
combining labor from both countries. The production of good I  can be thought of taking 
place “nowhere” or “in the air”, capturing the idea that the disintegration of production 
across borders that happens within global value chains implies goods are “made in the 
world”2. There is perfect competition in all goods’ markets.
II.1. Preferences
All inhabitants of North and all inhabitants of South have Cobb-Douglas utility. Respec-
tively:
• U X X X XI I( )0 0
1, = −a a  in North
• u x x x xI I( )0 0
1, = −b b  in South
2. “...More and more firms now organize production on a global scale and choose to offshore parts, compo-
nents or services to producers in foreign and often distant countries. The typical ’Made in’ labels in 
manufactured goods have become archaic symbols of an old era. These days, most goods are ’Made in the 
World’”. (antràs, p. [2016], Ch. 1 p. 4)
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where the subscript 0  refers to the non-tradable goods and the subscript 1  refers to the 
industrial good. Notice that we allow the preference parameters a  and b  to be poten-
tially different. This admittedly ad-hoc formulation will allow us to study how changes 
in consumption patterns that can be associated with global economic integration affect 
wages in both locations.
II.2. Production
Denote by HI  and LI , respectively, the quantity of skilled and unskilled labor from 
North allocated to the production of the industrial good, and by  I  the quantity of 
unskilled workers from South allocated to the production of the industrial good. Simi-
larly, ( 0H , L0 )  and  0  denote the quantity of workers allocated to the production of the 
local good in each country.
The production functions are the following.
For the international good I : 
 Q L HI I I I= + − ≤ ≤
/ −( ( ) )µ µ µγ γ δ γ δ 1 0 11 with
The expression 
1
1- g
 measures the elasticity of substitution between North’s and 
South’s unskilled labor.3 It varies from 1 to infinity when g  goes from 0  to 1 . The 
coefficient µ  measures some kind of relative weight of the North and the South labor in 
the production of the industrial good. There are different possible explanations for the 
existence of this relative weight (productivity or implicit embedded capital differences 
of the North and South labor inputs) and we will come back to them later. Note that the 
production of our industrial good is “fragmented”, to use a word of the policy debate, 
and that that fragmentation, whatever the precise meaning, will intuitively increase with 
µ  and g , everything else being kept equal.
For the local good in the North, we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function4: 
 Q H L0 0 0
1 0 1= < <−q q qwith
For the local good in the South: q =  0 .
3. Note that when g  goes to zero, we get Cobb-Douglas production functions (elasticity of substitution 
equal to 1):
lim ( ( ) ) ( )γ
γ γ δ γ δ δ δ δ
→
/ − − −+ − =0
1 1 11µ µ µ µ I I I I I IL H L H .
4. As in the case described in footnote 3, this function obtains in the limit when r ® 0  of 
( ( ) )θ θρ ρ ρ θ θH L H L0 0
1
0 0
11+ − =/ − . In a previous version, we have worked with this general form, obtaining 
similar results. We choose a Cobb-Douglas formulation here to ease the exposition.
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II.3. Labor Market Clearing Conditions
The balance equations for the labor force are:
• Skilled workers in North: H H HI= +0
• Unskilled workers in North: L L LI= +0
• Unskilled workers in South:   = +0 I  
II.4. Cost-Minimizing Input Choices
The quantity of each type of labor allocated to each good is determined following a 
cost-minimization process. Absolute wages are denoted by ( , , )W W wL H . It will prove 
useful to work with relative wages of northern to southern workers, which are defined as: 
 
W
w
w
W
w
wL L
H
H= =, .
The next Lemma reflects the input choices made for the production of the interna-
tional good, as functions of the prices of the North’s skilled and unskilled labor, and of 
the South’s (unskilled) labor.
Lemma 1.  The cost-minimizing inputs for the production of one unit of industrial 
good, are:
I Lw=
−




 +
−








− /
− +
− − −µ
δ
δ
µ
µ
δ γ
δ γ
γ
γ1 1
11
1
1 1



− + − /
−
1
1
δ δ γ
δwH
LI = −






−




 +
−


−
− − /
− +µ
µ
µ
δ
δ
µ
µ
γ δ γ
δ
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 








− − −
− + − /
−
−
−
1
1 1
1
1
1
1γ
γ
γ
δ δ γ
δ γw w wL H L
H wI L=
−




 +
−








− / −
−
−1 1
1
1
1 1δ
δ
µ
µ
µ
δ
δ γ γ
γ
γ




− /
−
δ δ γ
δwH
Proof.  See the Appendix.
The derivation of the unit cost functions for the two local goods is straightforward. 
We present the three unit cost functions in the following Lemma:
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Lemma 2.  The unit costs functions are:
• For the international good I : 
 C wI L= −
+
−









−
− / −
−
−1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
( )δ δ
µ
µ
µδ δ
δ γ γ
γ
γ


− /
−
δ δ γ
δw wH
1
• For the North’s local good: C W WH L0
1 1(1 )= −− − −q qq q q q .
• For the South’s local good: c w0 = .
We chose the the industrial good as the numéraire and normalize its unit cost (which 
equals its price) to 1: CI = 1.
At this point it is useful to come back to the idea of fragmentation. One natural way 
to measure it is with the ratio I IL/ : the higher it is, the larger is the participation 
of sourthen wokers in the global value chain. Note that, using the expressions above, it 
can be expressed as 
µ
µ
γ γ
1
.
1
1
1
1
−






− −wL  Everything else being kept equal, fragmentation 
increases with µ  and g . Such changes do modify endogenous wages, a fact that has to 
be captured by the investigation of the equilibrium.
III. The Equilibrium Equations
III.1. The Balance-of-Payments’ Equation
Strictly speaking, we have no such thing as a balance-of-payments’ equation, since the 
production of good I  is made “nowhere”. However, note that consumption of the indus-
trial good I  must be financed by the revenue of those workers who are engaged in the 
production of the industrial good. Therefore, in each country, the value of consumption 
of I  must equal the wage bill of workers engaged in the global value chain. Denoting 
QI  the total production of good I , and remembering that its unit price is normalized 
to 1 , we obtain, for the North: 
 a( ) ( )HW LW Q H W L WH L I I H I L+ = +  (1)
and similarly, for the South:
 bw Q wI I =  (2)
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Dividing one equation by the other we eliminate QI , so that:
 
α
β
H
w
L
w
H
w
L
wH L
I
I
H
I
I
L
   
+





 = +
Taking into account the above expressions for HI , LI , and I , we get: 
 
α
β
δ
δ
µ
µ
γ
γ
γH w
L
w wH L L
 
+





 =
−
+
−







 − − −1 1
1
1
1 1



+
−






−
− − −µ
µ
γ
γ
γ
1
1
1 1wL
We rewrite this as:
 
α
β δ
µ
µ
δ
δ
γ
γ
γH w
L
w wH L L
 
+





−
−




 −
−
=
− − −1 1 1 0
1
1 1  (3)
a simple relation between wL  and wH , to which we come back later. We will refer 
to it as the “Balance-of-payments equation”.
Note that this equation expresses the fact that the ratio of consumption of the indus-
trial good between the North and the South equals the ratio of their contribution to the 
value added of this good.
III.2. The Skilled Labor Market Equilibrium
Assuming, as above, that the production function for the local good in the North is Cobb-
Douglas, we can write that the total wage bill of skilled workers HWH  as: 
 HW HW LW wH H L= − + − + + −(( ) ( ))( ) ( )1 1 1α θ α δ δ β
The expression is made up by two parts:
•  ( ) ( )1− +α θ HW LWH L : the income received from the production of the local 
good in the North.
•  ( ) ( )1 [ ]− + +δ α βHW LW lwH L : the income received for the participation in the 
global value chain of good I . 
We thus obtain a a linear relation between the relative wages w W wH H= /  and 
w W wL L= / , namely:
 Hw Hw LwH H L= − + − + + −(( ) ( ))( ) ( )1 1 1α θ α δ δ β
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which can be rewritten as:
 w
AL
A H
w
A HH L
=
−
+
−
−( )
( )
( )1
1
1
δ β
 (4)
with A = − + −( ) ( )1 1α θ α δ . A  belongs to the segment [θ δ,1 ]- .
We will refer to equation (4) as the “Skilled labor market equation”.
III.3. The Good I’s Market Equilibrium
The third equation reflects the equilibrium in the international good I ’s market, 
equating its price to the unit cost P CI I= . As stated above, we normalize to price to 1: 
PI = 1 , and we have CI = 1: 
 
1
1
1
1
1
/
1
1 1
( )
( )
−
+
−










−
− −
−
−
δ δ
µ
µ
µδ δ
δ γ γ
γ
γwL

=
− /
−
δ δ γ
δ( )wH
1 1  (5)
We will refer to equation (5) as the “Normalization equation”.
III.4. Definition of Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a vector of wages ( , , )W W wL H  that constitutes a solution to the 
three-equation system formed by equations (3), (4), and (5).
III.5. Solving the System
Theorem 1.  An equilibrium exists and it is unique.
Equation (3) is of the form w f wH L= 1( ) , with f1  decreasing (note that this is inde-
pendent of the Cobb-Douglas assumption). Equation (4) is of the form w f wH L= 2( )  
with f2  increasing (note again that this is independent of the Cobb-Douglas assump-
tion). So f f1 2-  is decreasing, and:
 
w
f w f w
L
L L
0
1 2
↗
↘
∞
− +∞ −∞( ) ( )
which implies that there is a single point wL
*  such that f w f wL L1 2 0( ) ( )
∗ ∗− = .
FiGurE 1 provides an illustration of the equilibrium in the ( , )w wh l  space, which is 
represented by point E.
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wH
 b   1 – d
aH     d
 b   1 – d
 H    1 – A wL
45°
Balance-of-payments
Skilled labor market
Figure 1. – Equilibrium
After solving for ( )w wL H
* *,  we can use normalization equality CI = 1 to obtain w
* . 
Finally, absolute wages can then be recovered using the fact that W w wH H
∗ ∗ ∗=  and 
W w wL L
∗ ∗ ∗= .
This completes the solution of the model’s equilibrium. We next study two important 
properties of the equilibrium.
III.6. Equilibrium Properties
To go further into the study of the equilibrium, it proves useful to write equations (3), (4), 
and (5) in a more compact fashion. Respectively: 
α
β δ
δ
δ
( )Hw Lw m wH L
g
L
g+ − −
−
=− − −
1 1
01  (6)
( ) ( )1 1 0− − − − =A Hw ALwH L δ β  (7)
 ∆
m
m
m w w w
g g
L
g g
H+





 + =
− +





 − − −
−
−
1
1 1
1
1
1 1
d d
d( )  (8)
 with , andg m=
−
=
−
=
− −
γ
γ
µ
µ δ δδ δ1 1
1
1 1
∆
( )
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Note that ( , , )g m D  are all strictly positive. g( )g  is monotonically increasing in g  
and m( )µ  is monotonically increasing in µ . We can write equation (6) in the form: 
 w
H
m w
L
H
wH
g
L
g
L= +
−







−− − −
β
α δ
δ
δ
 1 11  (9)
The right-hand side, as noted above, is a strictly decreasing function of wL > 0 . 
Its derivative is:
 − −








− − − −L
H
g
H
m wg L
gβ
α δ
 1 1 1
Write equation (7) in the form:
 w
AL
A H
w
A HH L
=
−
+
−
−( )
( )
( )1
1
1
δ β
 (10)
The following proposition gives two results concerning the equilibrium, in line with 
our introductory presentation. The first one gives a simple and weak condition on the 
relative populations of skilled and unskilled workers in the North, which will imply 
that, in equilibrium, unskilled workers have a lower wage than the skilled ones and 
which is true in all numerical simulations (available upon request). The second one, 
w mL
∗ > /(1 ) , states that, in equilibrium, the wage of the unskilled workers in North 
relative to the unskilled workers’ wage in the South is higher than what is implied by 
their apparent relative productivity in the production of the industrial good. This relies 
on a weak condition concerning the number of workers in the South.
Proposition 1.  The following statements hold:
1. If 
L
H
A
A
>
−1
, then w wH L
∗ ∗> .
2. If m < 1  and b > L , then w mL
∗ > /1 .
Proof.  See the Appendix.
Point 1) is obvious, since the affine function defined by (10) has slope greater than 1. 
Regarding point 2), we note that m =
−
µ
µ1
 is an increasing function of µ,  and that 
the condition m < /1 d  limits attention to the case where m  is either smaller than 1 , 
which we have in mind for this setting, or not too much larger.
From now on, we assume m < 1 (which is equivalent to µ < /1 2 ).
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IV. Comparative Statics
We are now able to proceed to the core of our analysis, i.e. the comparative statics.
IV.1. Dependence on a
An increase in a  reflects a higher level of consumption of the industrial good by 
northern workers. It implies a downward shift of equation (9). The change in equa-
tion (10) depends on other parameters:
•  If θ δ< −1 ,  an increase in a  increases A  and 1
1- A
 and implies that
dwL < 0,  and d w wH L( ) 0/ > . 
• If θ δ>> −1 , dwH  is negative, and d w wH L( ) 0/ < .
The result is expressed in the following Lemma:
Lemma 3.  If da > 0 , then
• If θ δ≤ −1 ,  then dwL < 0,  and d w wH L( ) 0/ > .
• If θ δ>> −1 ,  then dwH  < 0  and d w wH L( ) 0/ < .
IV.2. Dependence on b
An increase in b  implies a higher consumption of the industrial goods by southern 
workers. It has two effects. It shifts up the curve defined by (9), and shifts up the line 
defined by (10), respectively by: 
 dw
H
m w dH
g
L
g′′ = +
−







− − −
α δ
δ
δ
β
1 11
dw
A H
dH′ =
−
−
( )
( )
1
1
δ
β

Note that since αδ < −1 A , we have dw dwH H′′ > ′ . Geometrically, it is obvious that 
the new intersection is such that dwH > 0,  but also dwL > 0,  and the price normaliza-
tion condition implies that dw < 0 .
What about d w wH L( )/ ? The answer is not obvious and requires some computa-
tions, which are provided in the appendix. It is clear that dWH  has to be positive. The 
fact that dWL > 0  results from additional computations.
We sum up:
Lemma 4.  If db > 0, then dwH > 0,  dwL > 0  and dw < 0.
It is also the case that d w wH L( ) 0,/ >  dWH > 0  and dWL > 0 .
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IV.3. Dependence on m
The parameter m  gives the weight of the South’s unskilled workers in the global value 
chain. The curve (9) shifts down in the relevant area and the line (10) is unaffected. 
Then, it is geometrically straightforward that dwH < 0,  dwL < 0,  and from the price 
normalization condition, it follows that dw > 0 . It is also clear that d w wH L( ) 0/ > . 
In terms of absolute wages, it follows that dWL < 0 .
Lemma 5.  If dm > 0 , then dwH < 0,  dwL < 0,  and dw > 0.
It is also the case that d w wH L( ) 0/ >  and dWL < 0 .
In terms of absolute wages, it is intuitively plausible that dWH > 0 . This is not 
generally true, but the situation obtains in our numerical computations whenever b  
becomes high enough.
IV.4. Dependence on g
An increase in the synthetic parameter g  implies an increase in g , which represents 
the elasticity of substitution between North’s and South’s unskilled workers in the global 
value chain. Geometrically, when g  increases, it lowers the curve (9) if mwL > 1,  
while leaving equation (10) unaffected.
Lemma 6.  If dg > 0 , then dwH < 0,  dwL < 0,  and dw > 0.
We also have d w wH L( ) 0/ > .
IV.5. Dependence on d
A decrease in d  (i.e. an increase in (1 )- d ), implying a lower weight of skilled workers 
in the production of good I , increases A  (and 
A
A1-
), shifting up the curve (9). Then 
the following obtains. 
Lemma 7.  If d  decreases, then dwH > 0 . 
One can also prove dwL > 0,  and d w wH L( ) 0,/ > unless L l/  is small, see the 
working paper version.
IV.6. Dependence on q
An increase in q  implies a higher share of unskilled workers in the production of the 
North’s local good. It increases A  and leaves the curve (9) unaffected.
Lemma 8. If dq > 0 , then dwH > 0,  dwL < 0,  and d w wH L( ) 0/ > . 
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IV.7. Summary
Consider the forces behind globalization. In our model, they are intuitively reflected by 
an increase in ( , ),µ γ  associated with the relative productivity and substitutability of 
South’s labor, and also with an increase in ( , ),β α  the income shares of the industrial 
good. We find:
A) Whenever there is an increase in the forces of globalization, through the competi-
tiveness of the South, i.e whenever ( , )µ γ  increase, d w wH L( ) 0/ >  obtains: i.e. there is 
a deterioration of the situation of the North low skilled workers relatively to the North high 
skilled. Indeed, in both cases dw > 0  and  dWL < 0 .
B) d w wH L( ) 0/ >  also obtains when the South’s income share of the industrial 
good, b , increases. For the North, an increase in a,  the sign of d w wH L( )/  is the same 
sign of ( )1- -δ θ .
C) The same d w wH L( ) 0/ >  is true whenever 1- d  increases, such a change 
being possibly interpreted as the effect of increasing innovation triggered by globalization.
D) The result d w wH L( ) 0/ >  still holds whenever q  increases (although such a 
move does not a priori reflect the forces of globalization).
V. A Simple Quantitative Analysis
In this section we use our model to perform a simple quantitative analysis. The objective 
is not to provide a fully-fledged calibration, but rather to help grasping the plausibility 
of our model when contrasted with real-world data.
We base this section on the empirical analysis of timmEr, m., et al. [2014], who 
provide an estimation of value added shares of different productive factors within global 
value chains (henceforth GVC). An interesting point in their analysis is that they are 
able to calculate value-added shares within geographical regions. They divide the world 
in two groups, placing “high income” countries on one side and the rest in a second 
group. We will identify “high income” countries with the North, and the second group, 
with the South.5 We use 1995 as our benchmark year.
We now discuss how we obtain the parameter values. First, notice that, in our simple 
model, we have assumed that the production function for the internationally traded good 
QI  uses only labor. In order to account for the share of capital we proceed as follows. For 
the North, we multiply the value added by each type of labor by a factor 
1
1- z
, where z  
is the value added share of capital. This method then allocates the capital stock to each 
type of labor, allocating more per-capita capital to skilled workers (i.e. those with higher 
wages). For the South, we follow the model and consider that it has only one production 
5. The countries listed as high income are the following: Australia, Canada, and the United States; Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan; and all 15 countries that joined the European Union before 2004.
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factor, which accounts for 100% of South’s value added of QI . We recalculate value 
added shares using the data in taBlE III in timmEr, m., et al. [2014]:
Table i. – Value Added Shares in Global Value Chains
H L 
1995
2008
19%
20%
54%
36%
27%
44%
For factor endowments we use the data provided in the Socio-Economic Accounts 
of the World Input-Output Database (WIOD, available at www.wiod.org). We use hours 
worked by labor type, and adjust the size of workforces to account for capital in the 
manner described above. We normalize l = 200  and set H = 10  and L = 36  to 
account for the relative sizes of workforces in the North and the South.
Equation (1) provides a relationship between the North’s consumption of the indus-
trial good QI  and the revenue obtained by workers in the North from the production of 
that good. Similarly for equation (2) that concerns the South. This means that we can 
back up a  and b  using data on the share of value added of QI  produced in each region, 
as well as each region’s GDP.6 timmEr et al. estimate that GVC value added accounted 
for 23% of the World’s GDP in 1995. That year, the GDP from the North and that of the 
South accounted for 77% and 23% of World GDP (Source: World Bank Develop ment 
Indicators’ database). Using this information it is easy to show that  equations (1) and (2) 
imply a = 0,21  and b = 0,26  respectively.
We set q = 0,6 , calculated using the average share of skilled labor in total compen-
sation in the North in non-tradable industries for the high-income countries (Source: 
WIOD). We set d = 0,81  to match the share of value added by skilled labor from 
taBlE I.
Parameters ( , )γ µ  are central to our analysis, as they determine the level of inter-
national fragmentation. The parameter g  governs the elasticity of substitution between 
North’s and South’s unskilled workers in the global value chain, which is given by s : 
we have γ
σ
σ
=
− 1
. For our tentative experiment, we set g = 0.75  which corresponds 
to s = 4 , following a somewhat bold interpretation of (a value close to) the mean esti-
mate for the US (4.17) provided by Broda, C., et al. [2006] in their estimations of trade 
elasticities for intermediate inputs.7. We take µ  as a free parameter, choosing the value 
required to match the shares in taBlE I, which is µ = 0.14 8.
6. Specifically we use a = +
+
Q H W L W
HW LW
I I H I L
H L
( )
( )
 and b = Q w
w
I I

.
7. The estimates in Broda, C. et al. are obtained from data covering 1995-2003. Given the lack of more 
recent data, we use the same value for 1995 and 2008.
8. Similar results obtain using different combinations of the pair ( , )g µ , for example the following: 
(0, 4; 0, 2), (0, 5; 0, 19). It is easy to see that both higher g  and µ imply higher equilibrium values of w and 
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taBlE II summarizes the parameter values with which our model exactly repli-
cates the 1995 factor shares of taBlE I, as well as the observed division of world’s GDP 
between the North and the South. We repeat the exercise for 2008, using the parameter 
values given in taBlE II.9
Table ii. – Parameter Values
a b q d g µ H L 
1995
2008
0,21
0,13
0,26
0,18
0,6
0,6
0,81
0,80
0,75
0,75 
0,14
0,23
10
12
36
29
200
200
We can now discuss what insights our model can provide to understand the changes 
shown in taBlE I. The main message arising from the comparison of the numbers for 
1995 and 2008 is that, quantitatively, the increase in the share of the South’s unskilled 
workers, from 27% to 44%, is driven exclusively by the increase in the fragmentation 
parameter µ , which changes from 0.14  to 0.23 , i.e. a 64% increase. There is no 
straightforward empirical proxy for µ  unfortunately.10 Still, our simple model generates 
patterns which are quite reasonable in light of the real-world data.
In line with the comparative statics presented in the previous section, the increase 
in the value-added share of South’s workers arising from higher µ  is accompanied with 
a reduction the wages of workers in the North, both in absolute terms and with respect 
to that of workers in the South. Wage inequalities in the North increase with the partic-
ipation of the South in the global value chain. These effects of globalization have been 
well documented (see e.g. Harrison a., et al. [2011]).
The impact of changes in consumption patterns, as given by a  and b , modify 
wages in line with the predictions of sECtion IV, but their impact on value-added shares 
is small. Changes in factor endowments, namely the increase in the relative size of the 
South and the increase in the relative endowment of skilled workers in the North, are 
relatively minor in size and have little explanatory power for the factor shares. The 
numerical version of the model therefore points to the changes in the production function 
of global value chains as the main driver of the evolution of wages and the distribution 
of global value added.
 I , which in turn generates a larger participation of the South both in the production of Qi  and in global 
GDP. Thus, larger values of µ require lower values for g  and viceversa.
9. In 2008, the South’s share of World’s GDP increased to 37%. Value-added in global value chains 
accounted for 15% of World’s GDP. Using equations (1) and (2) with these values we obtain the values for 
a and b provided in taBlE II.
10. There is no trade in a strict sense in the model. However, the GVC’s value-added originating in each 
country can be thought of as exports. The connection between GVC value-added and g, µ, d (simple in the 
case with g close to zero), can serve to provide a proxy to exports of the South (for which it is most likely 
that gross trade flows are larger than value-added terms) Such an analysis provide some ligth on µ. (see 
discussion paper)
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VI. Conclusion
We have provided a simple, perhaps too simple model, which allows us to exhibit more 
clearly the respective role of different forces relating to our present globalization, as 
factors of the inequalities increases in the North. The conclusions may look unsur-
prising given the modelling input. The mechanics of the model differs significantly from 
the standard Heckscher-Ohlin story and its actual mechanics is far from straightforward. 
Two equations govern equilibrium, the second one expresses in a rather intuitive way 
the determination of the wage of skilled labor in the North. The first one expresses the 
equality of the ratio of the contribution of the North and the South in the production of the 
industrial good with the ratio of its consumption. We are aware that a better intuition on 
this equality is a prerequisite to the generalization of the model, left for future research. 
We believe that the comparison of the theoretical perspectives with the stylised facts 
concerning the evolution of the world trade, as measured in the work of tillmEr et al., 
supports (or at least illustrates) the theoretical story developed here. Again, although 
the context differs much of the context of the seventies, eighties or nineties, in which 
Malinvaud developed his views on wages, we hope that our attempt at shedding light on 
the present forces in the labor market, echoes Malinvaud’s example and lessons.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Minimizing W L W H wL I H I I+ +   under the constraint:
 ( ) ln ln( ( ) )1 1 0− + + − =δ
δ
γ
µ µγ γH LI I I
we find:
W
HH I
=
−
λ
δ1
 W
L
L
L
I
I I
=
−
+ −
−
λδ
µ
µ µ
γ
γ γ
( )
( )
1
1
1

w
L
I
I I
=
+ −
−
λδ
µ
µ µ
γ
γ γ


1
1( )
Hence:
W
w
w
LL
L
I
I
= =
− −
−
( )1 1
1
µ
µ
γ
γ

 
W
w
w
L
H
H
H
I I
I I
= =
− + −
−
1 1
1
δ
δ
µ µ
µ
γ γ
γ


( )
It follows that:
L wI L I= −






−
−µ
µ
γ
1
1
1

H
w
L
I
H
I I
I
=
− + −




−
1 1 1
1
δ
δ
µ µ
µ
γ γ
γ


( )
=
−
+
− 











1 1
1
1δ
δ
µ
µ
γ
w
L
H
I
I
I


=
−
+
−











− − −1 1 1
1
1
1 1δ
δ
µ
µ
γ
γ
γ
w
w
H
L I
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The quantity I  needed to produce one unit is given by: 
1 1 1= + − / −( ( ) )µ µγ γ δ γ δI I IL H
= +
− 











/
/
−µ
µ
µ
δ γ
γ δ γ
δ δ1
1 1L HI
I
I I


= +
− 











−


/
/
µ
µ
µ
δ
δ
δ γ
γ δ γ
δ1
1 1LI
I
I




 +
− 











−
−
−
1
1
1
1
1
1δ
δ
γ δ
µ
µw
L
H
I
I
I


1−δ
=
−




 +
−






/
−
−
− − −µ
δ
δ
µ
µ
δ γ
δ
δ
γ
γ
γ1 1 1
11
1
1
1 1
w
w
H
L





− + /1
1
δ δ γ
I
Hence I . Substituting, we get HI  and LI
B. Proof of Lemma 4
Note that the slope of the curve (9) in w dw wH H L( , ) , ( , ),∗ + ′ ∗b b  is approximately: 
 − −








− − − −L
H
g
H
m wg L
gβ
α δ
 1 1 1
so that at the intersection with line 8 in w d dw dL L( , ) ,( )∗ + =β ν ν  
( )
( )
1 ( )
1 1
1 11−
−
+
−





 = +
−

 − − −
δ β
ν
α δ
δ
δ
 d
A H
A
A
L
H
d
H
m wg L
g





( )dβ
− +














− − − −L
H
g
H
m w dg L
gβ
α δ
ν
 1 1 1
α
α
β
α δ
ν
1
1 1 1
−





 +














− − − −
A
L
H
g
H
m w dg L
g
= +
−
−
−
−








− − −
α δ
δ
δ
δ α
β
H
m w
A
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g1 1 1
1
( )1
( )
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Multiplying by 
aH

: 
 
α
β
δ
ν
δ
δ
1
1 1 11 1 1
−





 +







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= +
−− − − − − − −
A
L
l
g m w d m wg L
g g
L
g
δ
δ α
β−
−
−



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



( )
( )
1
1
( )
A
d
Remembering that: 
 
α
β δ
δ
δ
( )Hw Lw m wH L
g
L
g+ − −
−
=− − −
1 1
01
so that:
 
α
β
δ
ν
α
β1
1 11 1
−





 +








= + −− − − −
A
L
l
g m w d Hw Lwg L
g
H L

( )
( −
−








δ α
β
)
( )1
( )
A
d
As:
 w
AL
A H
w
A HH L
=
−
+
−
−( )
( )
( )1
1
1
δ β
 
α
β
δ α α
β 
( )
( )
( )
Hw Lw
A A
Lw
H L
L+ −
−
−







 = −
1
1 1
we get:
 α β
δ
ν α
β
βL g l A m w d
Lw
dg L
g L+ −








=








− − − −(1 )
1
( )1 1
We now have to compare the slope 
wH
wL
at the initial point (*) (forget (*) now) 
 
( )
( )
1
1 1
−
−
+
−
δ β
A Hw
A
A
L
HL
to the slope of the line connecting the new equilibrium to the initial one, i.e 
 dw d
A
A
L
HH
′ / +
−
n
1
05a_AES125_126_Ekeland.indd   19 01/06/2017   08:45:23
JUAN CARLUCCIO, IVAR EKELAND AND ROGER GUESNERIE
20 © ANNALS OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS - 125/126, JUNE 2017
i.e 
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1 1
− /
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δ β ν d d
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A
A
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It is enough to compare: 
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i.e
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which is always true. 
C. Proof of Proposition 1
The condition w mL
∗ > /(1 )  holds true iff the value of the right-hand side for 
w mL = /1  is higher in equation (9) than in equation (10), namely: 
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α δ
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δ β 
H
m m
L
H
m
AL
A H
m
A
g g1 1
1
1
1
1 1 1− − + − −+
−







− >
−
+
−
−( )
( )
( )H
or: 
 
1
1
1
(1 )
1
1m
L
A A
β
αδ
αδ
β
β
αδ
δ
δ β

 
−
−







 > − − +
−
−
>
( )
( )
( )
05a_AES125_126_Ekeland.indd   20 01/06/2017   08:45:25
FRAGMENTATION AND WAGE INEQUALITY: INSIGHTS FROM A SIMPLE MODEL
 © ANNALS OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS - 125/126, JUNE 2017 21
If m < 1,  then a sufficient condition is: 
 1
1
(1 ]
1
1−
−







 > − −
−








L
A A( ) ( )
αδ
β
δ
αδ

At this point one should note that A < 1  implies that αδ < −1 A . So the right-
hand side is negative. Substituting b > L  in the left-hand side, we find that it is 
positive. So the inequality holds true, and the result is proved.
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